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LOVATO v DISTRICT COURT: THE DILEMMA
OF DEFINING DEATH
INTRODUCTION
Medical and technological advances, such as the transplantation of a
heart from one human being to another and the artificial maintenance of
circulatory and respiratory functions, have created a growing uncertainty as
to when life ends and death occurs. One thing has become increasingly cer-
tain: the common law definition of death as "[a] total stoppage of the circu-
lation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions
consequent thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc."' can no longer be
considered accurate.
The Colorado Supreme Court faced the dilemma of defining death for
seventeen-month-old Jerry Trujillo in Lovato v. Distr'ct Court. 2 The child had
been grossly abused 3 and was not breathing. He was hospitalized and
placed on a mechanical respirator.
The trial court determined, upon the testimony of the court-appointed
neurologist, the child's attending physician, and his consulting neurologist,
that the child had suffered total brain death caused by extensive brain dam-
age resulting from head trauma.4 The respondent district court ordered the
guardians ad lilem to execute a document authorizing the treating physician
and the hospital involved to remove all life-support equipment if in the doc-
tor's opinion the child was legally dead, as defined by the court.5 The
mother and guardians ad litem of the child petitioned the Colorado Supreme
Court to review the order.
The court, after an extensive discussion of modern scientific views, judi-
cial decisions, and recent legislation in other states, adopted the provisions of
the Uniform Brain Death Act. 6 The holding did not preclude a determina-
tion of death according to the traditional criteria of cessation of respiration
and circulation.
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed. 1968).
2. 601 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1979).
3. The child's mother, petitioner Rosalie Lovato, was arrested for child abuse. Guardians
ad lilen were appointed for Jerry Trujillo.
4. The child was completely comatose, was not breathing spontaneously, had no reflexes,
did not respond to even the most intense pain, had no cephalic responses (corneal, pharyngeal,
swallowing, and blinking), had fixed and dilated pupils, had a negative toxicological screen, and
had electrocerebral silence. Record, Exhibit I at 4, 44-47.
5. "ITihe legal definition of death in Colorado is that state which occurs when it is deter-
mined by a physician, based on reasonable medical standards, that there is no spontaneous
brain function and either spontaneous respiratory function or spontaneous circulatory function
cannot be restored by resuscitation or supportive maintenance." 601 P.2d at 1074.
6. "For legal and medical purposes, an individual who has sustained irreversible cessation
of all functioning of the brain, including the brainstem, is dead. A determination under this
section must be made in accordance with reasonable medical standards." 12 UNIFORM LAWS




In 1968, the Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School to Ex-
amine the Definition of Brain Death published its report. 7 The report de-
fined for the first time irreversible coma as a criterion for death. 8 The
following criteria were presented as establishing brain death: 1) unreceptiv-
ity and unresponsivity to even the most intensely painful stimuli; 2) an ab-
sence of spontaneous muscular movements or spontaneous respiration; 3) no
reflexes; and 4) a flat electroencephalogram (EEG).9 The report also stated
that hypothermia and'central nervous system depressants must be ruled out
as the cause of the coma. The EEG was not regarded as mandatory but was
viewed as having great confirmatory value. The criteria evaluate both
higher brain functions as well as lower brainstem (vegetative) functions.
The Task Force on Death and Dying of the Institute of Society, Ethics,
and the Life Sciences published a report in 1972 assessing the Harvard crite-
ria.10 The report concluded that the criteria and procedures were reason-
able and appropriate. A collaborative study group published its statement
of the criteria of cerebral death in 197711 in which the Harvard criteria were
slightly relaxed.
B. Leg'slation
Since 1970, when Kansas enacted the first brain death statute,'
2
twenty-four other states have enacted brain death statutes1 3 and two states
7. Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain
Death, A Deftinition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Irreversible
Coma ].
8. Since the Harvard report, the medical community has distinguished between brain
death and irreversible coma. Brain death implies total destruction of brain function with both
volitional and reflex responses absent. Irreversible coma refers to a vegetative state where all
higher brain functions are lost but certain vital functions such as respiration, temperature, and
blood pressure regulation may be retained. A Collaborative Study, An Appraisal of the Criteria of
Cerebral Death, 237 J.A.M.A. 982, 982 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Cerebral Death].
9. "Flat" electroencephalograph has been termed "electrocerebral silence" by the Ameri-
can Electroencephalographic Society to distinguish between low voltage activity in which pa-
tients can recover and no brain activity in which patients are brain dead and cannot recover.
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the-American Electroencephalographic Society on EEG
Criteria for the Determination of Cerebral Death, Cerebral Death and the Electroencephalogram, 209
J.A.M.A. 1505, 1506 (1969).
10. Report by the Task Force on Death and Dying of the Institute of Society, Ethics, and
the Life Sciences, Refments in Cn'teria for the Deermmnattion of Death.- An Appraisal, 221 J.A.M.A.
48 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Refiements].
11. See Cerebral Death, supra note 8.
12. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (1977 & Supp. 1979).
13. ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (Supp. 1980); ALAsKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (Supp. 1980); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 82-537 (Supp. 1979); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West Supp. 1979);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-139i(b) (West Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1715.1 (1979);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (Supp. 1979); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110 1/2, § 302(b) (1978); IOWA CODE § 702.8 (1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (West Supp.
1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 54F (1980 Repl. Vol.); MICH. COMP. LAws § 333.1021 (1980);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 50-22-101 (1979); NEv. REV. STAT. § 451.007 (1979); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2-4 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-323 (Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-301(g)
(Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 146.087 (1980 Repl. Vol.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-459 (1977
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have judicially sanctioned a concept of brain death. 14 The statutes are of
three general types: 1) those which define death as occurring when a person
has suffered a total and irreversible cessation of brain function;' 5 2) those
which define death as occurring with either an irreversible cessation of spon-
taneous respiration and circulation or irreversible cessation of brain func-
tion;' 6 and 3) those which define death as the cessation of circulatory and
respiratory functions or in the event these functions are being artificially
maintained death occurs with the total and irreversible cessation of brain
function. 17
Three organizations have drafted models for brain death statutes: the
Repl. Vol.); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447t (Vernon Supp. 1979); VA. CODE § 54-325.7
(Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 16-10-2 (Supp. 1980); WYO. STAT. § 35-19-101 (Supp. 1980).
14. State v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, 603 P.2d 74 (1979); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373
Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977), cert. denid, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978).
15. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, Nevada, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The state statutes are cited in
note 13 supra. California's statute is typical:
A person shall be pronounced dead if it is determined by a physician that the
person has suffered a total and irreversible cessation of brain function. There shall be
an independent confirmation of the death by another physician.
Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit a physician from using other usual and
customary procedures for determining death as the exclusive basis for pronouncing a
person dead.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West Supp. 1979).
16. Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, Oregon, and Virginia. The state statutes are cited in
note 13 supra. Kansas statute is typical:
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of a physi-
cian, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence of sponta-
neous respiration and cardiac function and, because of the disease or condition which
caused, directly or indirectly, these functions to cease, or because of the passage of time
since these functions ceased, attempts at resuscitation are considered hopeless; and, in
this event, death will have occurred at the time these functions ceased; or
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of a
physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence of
spontaneous brain function; and if based on ordinary standards of medical practice,
during reasonable attempts to either maintain or restore spontaneous circulatory or
respiratory function in the absence of aforesaid brain function, it appears that further
attempts at resuscitation or supportive maintenance will not succeed, death will have
occurred at the time when these conditions first coincide. Death is to be pronounced
before any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation.
These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all purposes in this
state, including the trials of civil and criminal cases, any laws to the contrary notwith-
standing.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (1977 & Supp. 1979).
17. Alabama, Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, and Texas. The state statutes
are cited in note 13 supra. Iowa's statute is typical:
A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a physician, based on
ordinary standards of medical practice, that person has experienced an irreversible
cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions. In the event that artifi-
cial means of support preclude a determination that these functions have ceased, a
person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of two physicians, based
on ordinary standards of medical practice, that person has experienced an irreversible
cessation of spontaneous brain functions. Death will have occurred at the time when
the relevant functions ceased.
IOWA CODE § 702.8 (1979).
This statute is almost identical to the proposal by Capron and Kass with the distinction
that the proposal did not require that two physicians participate in determining brain death.
Capron & Kass, A Statutory Defmitn of the Szandards for Detemiunng Hwnan Death.- An Appraisal and
a Pro/"ral, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 87, 111 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Statuliy Defiition].
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American Bar Association,' 8 the American Medical Association, 19 and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
20
C. Colorado's Recognition of Brain Death
In 1979, House Bill 1416, which would have statutorily recognized
brain death, was introduced and passed by the Colorado House of Repre-
sentatives.2 I The bill was essentially the Uniform Brain Death Act 22 with
the distinction that it added as an alternative definition of death: "an ab-
sence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function."'23 The Senate Judi-
ciary Committee amended the bill, adopting the American Bar Association
model, primarily upon the testimony of McCarthy DeMere, a lawyer-physi-
cian and the American Bar Association's advisor to the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.2 4 The bill, as amended, did not
pass out of the senate committee.
Lovalo presented a fact pattern which necessitated either judicial recog-
nition or rejection of a concept of brain death. The court acknowledged the
authority of the General Assembly to recognize statutorily the standards by
which death is to be determined and seemed to try to adhere to the 1979
proposal of the Colorado House Judiciary Committee.
18. "For all legal purposes, a human body with irreversible cessation of total brain func-
tion, according to usual and customary standards of medical practice, shall be considered
dead." 61 A.B.A. J. 464 (1975). This model was adopted by Montana and Tennessee. The
state statutes are cited in note 13 supra.
19. The AMA changed its position on the necessity of brain death legislation when it de-
veloped a model bill in January 1979. The model, as modified in December 1979, provides:
"An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory
functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, shall be considered
dead. A determination of death pursuant to this section shall be made in accordance with
accepted medical standards." Position Paper of the American Medical Association, Legislative
Department, Public Affairs Division (Dec. 13, 1979).
20. See note 6 upra.
21. For legal and medical purposes, an individual is dead if: (a) he has sustained
irreversible cessation of all functioning of the brain, including the brainstem; or (b) he
has an absence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function. A determination of
death under this section shall be made in accordance with reasonable medical stan-
dards.
H.B. No. 1416, 52d Colo. Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1979).
22. See note 6 supra.
23. H.B. No. 1416, 52d Colo. Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1979).
24. Dr. DeMere believes that the common law definition of death is incorrect and that
there is a need for a legal definition of death. DeMere advocates the ABA model. See note 18
slpra .
Dr. DeMere's criticisms of H.B. No. 1416 are:
1. The title says, "Determination of death;" it is a definition and not a determination.
"Determination" is a medical term.
2. It is wrong to establish medical purposes in law.
3. "Individual" is ambiguous; it should be "human body."
4. There is a difference between functioning of the brain and brain function.
5. The bill varied the Uniform Brain Death Act by adding an alternative definition of
death. The absence of spontaneous respiration is not death if the brain is functioning. (For
example, polio victims.)
6. "Reasonable medical standards" should be "usual and customary standards." Heanngs
on H.B. No. 1416 Before the Colorado Senate Judiaivy Comm., 52d Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess., April 16,
1979, Tape Top Meter 13:50:33 [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings I]. See also Hamlon &
Burns, Minnesota "Brain Death" Legislatio A Step Forward... or Backward?, 62 MINN. MED. 363
(1979). But set Uniform Brain Death Act, 29 NEUROLOGY 417 (1979).
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II. ANALYSIS
Lovalo sanctioned a concept of brain death. This concept prescribes
that a physician who determines that a person meets the criteria of brain
death, as established by the medical community, pronounce the person
dead. It is crucial to realize that Lovalo is not a part of the In re Qutnlan line
of right-to-die cases25 which allow life-support systems to be withdrawn
where a patient is in an irreversible coma. 26 It is important to keep the
ethical question, "When should a person be allowed to die?," separate from
the medical question, "When should a person be pronounced dead?"'2 7 Six
states with brain death statutes specifically mandate that death be pro-
nounced before means of supporting respiratory and circulatory functions
are terminated.
28
Much of the opposition to the concept of brain death, both among those
in the medical community and laymen, stems from a misconception that
persons can recover from a complete cessation of brain function. 29 In every
instance in which a person has been found to recover from "an absence of
brain function" the criteria had not been fulfilled. 30 Thus, the validity of
the criteria must be considered to be established with as much certainty as is
possible in medicine. 31 Opposition also arises among laymen who try to link
brain death with euthanasia. Euthanasia is the "act or practice of painlessly
putting to death persons suffering from incurable and distressing disease"
3 2
as an act of mercy, whereas brain death criteria merely allow a physician to
pronounce death.
Criticism has also revolved around the variation in statutes and propos-
als. 3 3 The critics maintain that if agreement cannot be reached, it is prema-
ture to draft legislation.34 While it is true that there has not been agreement
25. Eg., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); In re Eichner, 102 Misc. 2d 184,
423 N.Y.S.2d 580 (Sup. Ct.), affd &modifedssub nom., Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426
N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980). Other cases following Qianan allow a terminal patient to refuse medical
treatment. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
26. See note 8 supra.
27. Refinements, supra note 10. See also Manning & Vogel, The Case for "'Brain Death" Legisla-
tion, A Response to the Critics, 62 MINN. MED. 121 (1979).
28. Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. The state statutes
are cited in note 13 supra.
29. See, e.g., Byrne, O'Reilly & Quay, Brain Death-An Opposing Viewpoint, 242 J.A.M.A.
1985 (1979). The article speaks of hypothermia victims and victims of depressant poisons being
"resurrected from the dead." Hypothermia is specifically excluded from the brain death crite-
ria. See Iareoer~rie Coma, supra note 7.
Testimony of William G. Small of the Colorado Knights of Columbus, an organization of
Catholic laymen, refers to a condition where the detectable functioning of the brain has been
suspended by drugs, heavy anesthesia, or hypothermia. See Senate Heanngs I, supra note 24. Pa-
tients who have had central nervous system depressants or who are suffering from hypothermia
are specifically excluded from the brain death criteria. See Irreversible Coma, supra note 7.
30. Veith, Fein, Tendler, Veatch, Kleiman & Kalkines, Brain Death, 238 J.A.M.A. 1651,
1652 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brain Death].
31. Id.
32. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 654 (4th ed. 1968).
33. See notes 13, 15-22 supra and accompanying text.
34. See, e.g., Heanngs on H.B. No. 1116 Before the Colorado Senate Judiriary Con , 52d Gen.
Assembly, 1st Sess., May 14, 1979, Tape Top Meter 16:01:16 (testimony of Mary Urbisch of
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in the drafting of statutes, there has been agreement on the medical criteria
which determine brain death.3 5 Although it might be ideal for all states to
adopt a uniform definition of brain death,3 6 the lack of an acceptable uni-
form definition is not sufficient grounds for rejecting the concept of brain
death.
This lack of uniformity was not the reason House Bill 1416 was rejected.
The Colorado Senate Judiciary Committee did not pass the bill primarily
because the committee felt that there was a lack of a demonstrated need for
the bill.37 The Colorado Supreme Court, in Lovato, found a demonstrated
need.3 8 Lovato presented precisely the fact pattern which would necessitate
the recognition of brain death: a human being who is clearly brain dead and
a person with an interest so adverse as to challenge a determination of
death. 39 Lovato is perhaps less controversial than other cases which have
considered brain death, as the victims in the other cases had been removed
from life-support systems prior to the court's ruling.' Many cases were fur-
ther complicated by the victim's organs being removed for transplantation. 4'
Colorado Right to Life) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings If]; Hamlon & Burns, Mnnesota
"Brain Death" Legislation. A Step Forward . . .or Backward?, 62 MINN. MED. 363 (1979).
35. See Irreversible Coma, supra note 7; Refmements, supra note 10; Cerebral Death, supra note 8;
Brain Death, supra note 30. See generally Beecher, After the "Definition of Irreversible Coma," NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1070 (1969) (editorial); Black, Brain Death (Part II), 299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 393
(1978); Black, From Heart to Brain: The New DefMitions of Death, 99 AM. HEART J. 279 (1980)
(editorial).
36. The American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws are working together on a model which
would be acceptable to all three organizations. Telephone interview with Jeffery M. Stokols,
Legislative Attorney, Department of State Legislation, American Medical Association.
37. The committee relied on the testimony of Dr. Richard Weil, III, transplant surgeon at
the University of Colorado Medial Center, and Dr. Earl C. Hutchins, neurologist. They testi-
fied that in the absence of a statute, patients were being declared dead on the basis of brain
death criteria. See Senate Hearings I, supra note 24.
38. In the absence of all other medical testimony, after reading the affidavit of Thomas
Reichert, Jerry Trujillo's attending physician, who could doubt that the child was dead?
Currently a putrefying odor emanates from the baby's body through a trach tube
inserted in its throat. The stench becomes stronger day by day. Nurses and techni-
cians must leave the vicinity of the body to recouperate [sic] from time to time. For
the past few weeks he has laid limp with no neurologic activity from his brain, brain-
stem or spinal cord. He has bilateral detached retinas. He makes no tears. They must
be given to him artifically every hour to prevent his eyes from drying out. He feels no
pain though the people attending him are overcome with it. His face, eyelids, and
conjunctiva are swollen due to poor circulation, lack of normal brain mechanisms and
lack of muscle tone. He has been unable to maintain normal temperature without
heating blankets. . . . During all of this his brain has never functioned - - - - not in
the slightest degree. Not even for one second.
Record, Exhibit 2, Affidavit of Dr. Thomas Reichert.
39. In Lovato, it was established that Jerry Trujillo was brain dead. See note 4 supra. The
petitioner, Rosalie Lovato, faced criminal charges for child abuse which could be changed to
murder or manslaughter if the child died.
40. See, e.g., State v. Fierro, 124 Ariz. 182, 603 P.2d 74 (1979) (defendant convicted of first-
degree murder); State v. Shaffer, 223 Kan. 244, 574 P.2d 205 (1977) (defendant convicted of
first-degree murder); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978) (defendant convicted of first-degree murder); People v. Vanderford,
77 Mich. App. 370, 258 N.W.2d 502 (1977) (defendant convicted of involuntary manslaughter);
State v. Brown, 8 Or. App. 72, 491 P.2d 1193 (1971) (defendant convicted of second-degree
murder); Cranmore v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 722, 271 N.W.2d 402 (1978) (plaintiff convicted of first-
degree murder).
41. See, e.g., State v. Shaffer, 223 Kan. 244, 574 P.2d 205 (1977); Commonwealth v. Gol-
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The Colorado Supreme Court cannot be accused of balancing the interests
of the petitioner with those of medical personnel who could be subject to
criminal charges for terminating a patient's life.
42
The extensive discussion of the development of the concept of brain
death indicates that the Colorado Supreme Court understood the problem
before it.4 3 The major flaw in the opinion is that the court, after discussing
the various statutes and models for defining brain death, adopted the provi-
sions of the Uniform Brain Death Act, 4 4 while acknowledging that only one
state had adopted the act. 45 By adopting the model with the least support,
the court's holding seems hasty. Implicitly, the court was trying to adhere to
the intent of the Colorado legislature.46 The court seems to have been una-
ware of the criticisms of the proposal which led to its defeat. 4 7 Regrettably,
the court failed to address the relative merits of the various definitions of
brain death.
The purpose of each of the statutes is to allow new criteria, as deter-
mined by the medical community, to be used to determine death. The ap-
proaches taken by the statutes vary: some statutes set forth what the
alternatives are;48 some statutes set forth when the alternatives will be
used;4 9 some statutes set forth the definition of brain death and then state
that this definition does not preclude use of the traditional criteria for deter-
mining death; 50 and some statutes set forth only a definition of brain
death. 51 The first type of statute is criticized because it gives the appearance
that there are separate phenomena of death. 52 This fault is most serious
when the brain death alternative specifically mentions organ transplanta-
tion: it can create a belief that a separate definition of death has been cre-
ated permitting death to be declared prematurely to allow organs to be used
more beneficially. Other statutes state that death occurs when respiration
and circulation cease or, in the event these functions are being artificially
maintained, death occurs upon irreversible cessation of brain function. This
definition can be criticized because it is inaccurate and redundant. Death
does not occur when respiration and circulation cease; a polio victim, for
ston, 373 Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978); Cranmore v.
State, 85 Wis. 2d 722, 271 N.W.2d 402 (1978).
42. At the time of the hearing, the child's vital functions were being maintained by artifi-
cial means. 601 P.2d at 1074.
43. Part of the reason H.B. No. 1416 did not pass seems to be that the Senate Judiciary
Committee did not understand the purpose of the bill. See Senate Hearings 11, supra note 34.
44. See note 6 supra.
45. Two states, Nevada and West Virginia, have adopted the Uniform Brain Death Act.
West Virginia adopted the act in the 1980 legislative session. The state statutes are cited in note
13 supra.
46. 601 P.2d at 1081.
47. See note 24 supra.
48. See note 16 stpra.
49. See note 17 supra.
50. California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, and North Carolina. The state statutes are
cited in note 13 supra.
51. Arkansas, Illinois, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Wyo-
ming. The state statutes are cited in note 13 supra.
52. See generaly Statutoq Dfvitton, note 17 supra; Kennedy, The Kansas Statute on Death, 285




example, may never spontaneously respire, but the brain can continue to
function if the patient is maintained on a mechanical respirator.53 The defi-
nition is redundant because one of the criteria of brain death is the absence
of spontaneous respiration;54 therefore, it need not be denominated in the
statute. The statutes which state that the concept of brain death does not
preclude the use of traditional criteria of death can create the feeling that
there are alternative definitions of death.55 The statutes which define death
solely in terms of brain death may wrongly create the impression that each
death must be determined according to the criteria of brain death.
56
In 1968, when the Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School to
Examine the Definition of Brain Death made its report, 57 it stated that no
statutory change in the law would be necessary unless the medical commu-
nity failed to agree about the standards of brain death. Despite apparent
agreement in the medical community, however, twenty-five states have
passed brain death statutes. 58 Prior to the brain death statutes, the defini-
tion of death was a matter of common law.59 As more states adopt brain
death statutes there is increasing pressure on the other states to follow suit in
defining death statutorily. The statutes themselves point out the difficulties
in drafting a statute which will define death.
A review of the various statutes and proposals will make evident that
there is no ideal definition of death. Every death could be determined ac-
cording to the "irreversible cessation of brain function" test. The irreversible
cessation of cardiopulmonary functions is not death so long as the person is
resuscitable: death occurs when the brain has been deprived too long of
oxygen. As Capron and Kass point out, however, there are disadvantages to
adopting a statute which speaks of death only in terms of brain function: it
would be a sharp break from tradition, and, in most instances, the tradi-
tional methods of determining death are perfectly adequate.
6 °
Brain death criteria in determining death are applicable almost entirely
to terminal patients who are connected to life-support equipment. Their
impact will also be felt in cases where there is a question of survivorship and
53. See, e.g., Senate Hear:ngs I, supra note 24.
54. See Irreversible Coma, supra note 7.
55. The statutes are actually trying to provide for different means of detecting death.
56. The criteria for determining brain death are specific. See note 7 supra and accompany-
ing text. See also Refinements, supra note 10; Cerebral Death, supra note 8. Cardiopulmonary tests
are perfectly adequate for determining death in most instances. Statutog Defrmitin, supra note
17, at 113.
57. Irreversible Coma, supra note 7.
58. The state statutes are cited in note 13 supra.
59. The reluctance to discard the traditional signs of life, respiratory and circulatory func-
tions, is vividly demonstrated in Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1952). This case was a
will contest involving a question of the survivorship of Mr. and Mrs. Gugel. They were in an
automobile that was hit by a train. Mrs. Gugel was decapitated; there was blood gushing from
her body in spurts. "Realistically, a person is dead when there has been a complete decapita-
tion of the head .... " Id. at 497. Nevertheless, the court concluded, in reliance upon medical
testimony, that a body is not dead so long as there is a heartbeat as evidenced by blood gushing
from the body in spurts. This is so even though the brain may have quit functioning. Thus, the
court specifically rejected brain death.
60. Statutory Defnition, supra note 17.
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evidence of a heartbeat in a victim is introduced.6' Lovato overruled Sauers v.
StokZ62 to the extent that the latter negated a concept of brain death. The
court in Sauers held that evidence of a faint pulse and blood spurting from
the cracked skull of one of the accident victims refuted the application of the
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. 63 Medical testimony received in Lovato
stated that the heart is an autonomous organ which can continue to beat
even with complete destruction of the brain or brain functions. 64 It would
appear that eyewitness testimony regarding the presence of circulation will
no longer be enough to prove life. 65 One article suggests that cessation of
cardiac function is a cause of death and not a component of the definition of
death. ,6
Although it is questionable whether there is a need for a statute defining
death,6 7 there is a need to recognize legally the concept of brain death. The
courts, as part of an adversary process, are perhaps more subject to an accu-
sation of engaging in a balancing game, for example, balancing the interests
of the medical community against the interests of a criminal defendant. Any
statute concerning brain death should make the determination of death
mandatory. The word "may" in a statute has the connotation that the de-
termination is dependent upon the consent of relatives or the attending phy-
sician. Furthermore, despite the problems with alternative standards of
determining death, it is probably advisable for a statute to have alternative
standards: it makes the statute more acceptable to the medical community
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and the general public. By codifying the definition of death, a statute which
does not specifically mention the standards of cardiopulmonary functions
may be viewed as excluding this standard. Although this article has repeat-
edly attempted to show that the absence of respiratory and circulatory func-
tions is not death, but rather that death occurs when these functions cannot
be resuscitated, the author does not believe it is necessary for a statute to
specify that these functions must not be resuscitable. A statute defining
death should be flexible enough to keep pace with medical and technological
advances but certain enough to protect the interests involved. Ultimately,
the medical profession will be responsible for ensuring that customary and
usual standards are followed in determining when each human being has
died.
61. See, e.g., Gray v. Sawyer, 247 S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1952); Vaegemast v. Hess, 203 Minn.
207, 280 N.W. 641 (1938) (a constricted heart empty of blood indicates that the heart kept
bleeding; thus, the victim was alive even though her viscera, including the cerebrum, were
strewn along the train track).
62. 121 Colo. 456, 218 P.2d 741 (1950).
63. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-613 (1973). The statute specifies how property shall be
disposed of if there is not sufficient evidence to show that the parties in question died other than
simultaneously.
64. 601 P.2d at 1081.
65. Nonmedical testimony regarding the presence of respiration would be enough to estab-
lish life because one of the criteria of brain death is the absence of respiration. See note 7 supra.
66. Brain Death, supra note 30, at 1654.
67. The statutes have not put an end to litigation. See, e.g., State v. Shaffer, 223 Kan. 244,
574 P.2d 205 (1977); People v. Vanderford, 77 Mich. App. 370, 258 N.W.2d 502 (1977). There
will also undoubtedly be challenges as to whether the criteria of brain death were properly
applied.
68. Set note 19 supra.
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CONCLUSION
The facts of Lovato necessitated that the court either accept or reject a
concept of brain death. The court rightly accepted the concept. Despite the
court's encouragement of brain death legislation, it is unlikely that the legis-
lature will attempt to redefine brain death in the absence of an acceptable
uniform definition due to the inherent problems in drafting a statute defin-
ing death. The definition which the court adopted may not have been the
best one, but it should safely allow a physician to pronounce a person dead
according to brain death criteria and thus uphold the dignity of life-and
death.
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